WAR, TERROR, AND "BRUTE" KRULAK...

The Terror War's Inevitable Fog
By Arnold Kling Published 01/09/2004


Ridgway turned to Humphrey and said there was one thing about the war which puzzled him.
"What's that?" Humphrey asked.
"I have never known what the mission for General Westmoreland was," Ridgway said.
-- David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest

David Halberstam's post mortem of the bureaucratic process that took the United States into the Vietnam war influenced me profoundly. My outlook on business, investing, entrepreneurship, software development, technology, and public policy all have been affected by his book, which I first read thirty years ago when I was an undergraduate.



What I took away from reading and re-reading Halberstam was the view that human beings make decisions in the context of incomplete information. We suffer from inadequate knowledge, cognitive biases, and conflicting expert opinions. I call this human condition The Inevitable Fog.



The remainder of this essay (which is long -- it may be easier to print it out rather than try to read it on line) is a tour of the world of inevitable fog. First, I describe the way various aspects of life are affected by fog. Then, I review David Halberstam's thinking about Vietnam. Next, I look at the various fogs of Iraq. Finally, I discuss the fog of the overall war on terror.



The Prevalence of Fog



The familiar expression "fog of war" refers to the difficulty that generals have in seeing all of the relevant forces on the battlefield and beyond. In fact, everyone involved in a war suffers from its fog. During World War II, many American GI's, aware only of the mistakes on our side, were convinced that the United States was going to lose. What they saw were logistical mishaps, waste, unexplained changes in direction, and other signs of incompetence on the part of their superiors. The very term SNAFU is an acronym coined by grunts for "situation normal: all f---ed up."



One sees the same phenomenon in business or civilian government organizations. The leaders never see the entire picture. Meanwhile, as grunts we gather around the water cooler and trade stories which supposedly demonstrate that our bosses are idiots and our co-workers on the other side of the building are jerks. A business organization makes a seemingly suicidal amount of mistakes every week, but in the fog of business its competitors are committing errors at roughly the same rate.



Stock market investing takes place in a fog. At any point in time, there are plausible future scenarios under which the fair value of the market indexes could be double what it is today, and other scenarios which suggest that the market's true value is half its current level. Similarly, there are plausible scenarios under which particular stocks or groups are screaming buys, and equally plausible scenarios under which those same stocks are must-sells.



No one lives in more of a fog than an entrepreneur. Almost by definition, you are the only one who believes that your business idea makes any sense. Nine times out of ten, the skeptics are right. I describe my own entrepreneurial career, which turned out better than most, as A Sequence of Miscalculations.



Software development takes place in a fog. In a project that follows a textbook "lifecycle" process, coding does not begin until the developers have a final, precise written set of requirements. Nowhere in the history of software has a program been developed according to that model. Instead, the Geeks begin work in a fog about what the Suits really want. They make their best guess, deliver a prototype, and then the Suits and the Geeks start to argue. When the two sides reach a point of being hopelessly deadlocked, a version gets released.



Technological progress has many sources of fog. We do not exactly know which scientific studies will lead to interesting results. When something important is discovered, we do not necessarily know which are the most promising applications. We do not know which promising applications will actually be successful in the market. Thomas Edison thought that a phonograph would be used by business executives to record and ship speeches to workers.



No wonder venture capital investing seems like a shot in the dark. Given the fog that surrounds innovation, a venture capitalist that happens to back a couple of winners with one fund may have a string of losers with the next.



Perhaps the most important point of all is that government officials operate in a fog. If one looks at all of the imperfections and shortcomings of the market, then there appears to be a nearly infinite set of opportunities for the government to improve on private sector outcomes. However, it is important to remember that the information that government has is often no better than what is available to private individuals.



For the private sector, one of the most important signals that cuts through the fog is the profit and loss statement. If nothing else, a company that makes too many mistakes will find itself out of business. Government programs are insulated from such signals. I believe that as the pace of innovation has increased in our society, the relative inefficiency of government has gone up. Both private-sector operations and government programs become anomalous and obsolete more rapidly. However, government anomalies persist, while in the private sector market discipline serves to weed out failure. The more dynamic the economy, the larger the drag exerted by the government.



Vietnam, Halberstam, and Fog



Much as I admire The Best and the Brightest, I believe that David Halberstam himself is not above the fog. His account of the Vietnam era suffers from cognitive biases which are evident, even though Halberstam had mastered the New York Times reporter's subtle art of injecting his opinions via adjectives. Thus, American hawks are described as "rigid" and "hardline," while he introduces doves as "nuanced" and "flexible."



When Halberstam discusses our South Vietnamese allies, they are "feudal," "corrupt," and remnants of a "dying order." On the other hand, our adversaries are characterized as "modern," "indigenous," and a "revolutionary force." I long to grasp Halberstam by the lapels and ask him: if the Vietnamese Communists were so in tune with the general population, why was their regime so repressive? Why did they have to murder and drive out so many hundreds of thousands of South Vietnamese when they took over? Why is it that in the middle school near where I live in suburban Maryland the most common name in the PTA phone directory is Nguyen?



One way to appreciate the fog that still surrounds the Vietnam war is to look up "Krulak" in the index of Halberstam's book as well as in The Savage Wars of Peace by Max Boot. Both Halberstam and Boot describe Victor Krulak as a Marine Corps Major General, short in stature, with the nickname "Brute." There, the similarity ends.



Boot describes Krulak as "a first-rate fighter and thinker." Boot presents Krulak as the bureaucracy's Rambo, a man who could have won the Vietnam war had the civilians not held him back. Boot describes his approach as follows:



"It would take aggressive small-unit foot patrolling, especially at night, to gather intelligence and disrupt guerilla operation. Above all, it would mean training local people to defend themselves... Krulak wanted to combine this pacification strategy with the bombing and mining of Haiphong harbor."



Halberstam sees Krulak as "the military's most skilled bureaucratic player... where his special assignment was to destroy any civilian pessimism about the war and to challenge the civilian right to even discuss military progress, or lack thereof." Krulak was active in what Halberstam views as the military's conscious effort to deceive civilians about the prospects for success in Vietnam.



" as the official minutes of the special counterinsurgency group reveal for that crucial period ('February 7, 1963 Krulak says real progress is being made in the struggle. Vietcong morale is deteriorating... March 14, 1963 Krulak says Vietcong activity is at a level 50 percent below last year... May 9, 1963 Krulak, back from a Honolulu meeting with Harkins, says that all trends are favorable... May 23 Colonel Francis Serong, Australian guerilla fighting expert, expresses doubt on the Strategic Hamlet Program saying it is overextended, and that it has left vast areas from which the Vietcong can operate freely. Krulak immediately and violently challenges him...')" (ellipses in the original)



Halberstam's Krulak is a vicious hawk, painting a falsely optimistic picture in order to stiffen the resolve of the civilians to maintain the war effort. Boot's Krulak is a sophisticated counterinsurgency fighter, trying to substitute a patient, population-centered strategy for the costly "search-and-destroy" approach used by U.S. commander William Westmoreland.



I am in no position to pass judgment on which writer has captured the real Krulak (perhaps there is a grain of truth in each). The point is that much about Vietnam remains unclear. Even after the fact, the war is covered in fog.



The Downfall of an Elite



The title The Best and the Brightest refers to the hold that a social and intellectual elite had on foreign policy in the 1950's and 1960's. This gave our leaders a narrow base of experience on which to draw. To put words in Halberstam's mouth, they thought that they could deal with the threat of a Communist takeover in Vietnam the way that a Wall Street lawyer might deal with a hostile takeover bid for a major corporation: play tactical hardball, show your resolve, get the adversary to back down, and negotiate a reasonable settlement.



Even the corporate takeover metaphor would represent a less inbred power structure than what Halberstam described. Hostile takeovers emerged as a phenomenon in the 1980's, when Wall Street had opened up and become more flamboyant. The investing public was treated to stories of "the poison pill," "the Pac-Man defense," and so on. This sort of media-reported warfare would have been anathema to the establishment figures who joined the Kennedy Administration. In those days, Wall Street lawyers valued discretion. Issues between corporations were to be resolved at the luncheon club, not in the newspapers.



Thus, Halberstam pictures America's leaders in the 1960's as having traveled in small circles -- elite prep schools, entrance to college based as much on family connections as merit, and a Wall Street atmosphere of rationality and discretion. They proceeded to apply what worked in that context to an underdeveloped Asian country half way around the world.



As for Vietnam itself, Halberstam's view in a nutshell is that it was simply a replay of the civil war in China that resulted in the Communist takeover in 1949. In both cases, the luck of the historical draw gave the Communist side the better leaders, the more highly-motivated forces, and the broader base of popular support. In China, the United States stood aside and let events take their course. We did not do that in Vietnam, in large part because the repercussions of "losing" China had been so traumatic for the Democratic Party and for the State Department.



Halberstam's view is that losing in Vietnam was inevitable. Regardless of what took place on the battlefield, in contemporary language our "nation-building" was a failure.



Halberstam characterizes our military leaders as dense, with an almost sadistic desire to throw more and more bombs and troops into the jungles of Vietnam. He argues that the Joint Chiefs wanted the war badly enough that they helped to manipulate the civilians into it. I suspect a different military-civilian dynamic, which I will discuss below under combat operations in the Fogs of Iraq.



The Fogs of Iraq: Pre-War



As with Vietnam, the question of the necessity of the Iraq war is thick with fog. There is the issue of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as well as the larger strategic context in the war against Islamist terror.



On the issue of WMD, the United States parted company with France and Germany, among others. For this, the American left blames Bush ("he lied!") while the American right blames the other governments ("axis of weasels!").



My sympathies tend to be with the right. I think of Saddam Hussein's prewar behavior as analogous to a guy with a criminal record walking down the street in an overcoat with what appears to be a gun underneath. The police tell him to open up his coat, and he refuses. At that point, if I were the police, I would assume that he has a gun and proceed accordingly.



However, my point is not that the left or the right was clearly correct on the WMD issue. My point is that the WMD issue was part of the inevitable fog.



The other pre-war issue is how regime change in Iraq fits in to the overall war against Islamist terror. There, it seems to me that the fog will take a long time to lift. I will return to this issue in the final section of this essay.



The Fogs of Iraq: Combat Operations



There was a brief period a few weeks before Baghdad fell during which the fog of war was quite thick. Our offensive appeared to be stalled, and our media painted a picture that was very pessimistic. It was in that environment that I wrote Can You Comment?, a satirical attempt to view the state of the war from the perspective of the Iraqi regime's perspective. My point was that their side's problems had to be worse than ours.



At the low point, reporters found a number of ex-military officers -- and some current officers -- who argued that we needed many more troops. To me, this is reminiscent of Vietnam, in which our military seemed to always be asking for more troops and more freedom of operations.



In estimating the troop requirements for any operation, there are going to be some generals whose guesses are high and some generals whose guesses are low. During Vietnam, our civilian leaders wanted to believe the lowest estimates. This had two consequences. One was that it biased the civilians in favor of the most optimistic generals. The other consequence was that many in the military felt that there were not sufficient resources to achieve success, and they applied pressure for more. Halberstam interprets this as political hawkishness ("demands for escalation") on the part of the military, when in fact it was more likely that it represented, as it did in Iraq, a genuine concern to avoid failure. In both situations, there were military officers who believed that victory required a larger force. Given the inevitable fog, there are bound to be officers who feel that way, and sometimes they will turn out to be correct.



As events unfolded, we succeeded in Iraq with a lower number of troops than the most conservative generals thought was necessary. Perhaps unlike in Vietnam, where in the beginning the civilians only listened to the generals with the most optimistic assessment, for Iraq our leadership was not overly biased in its selection of force levels. Maybe they chose an invasion force that was close to the "average" of what generals thought was needed. Or perhaps in Iraq the civilians also insisted on lower troop levels than prudence would have dictated, but we just got lucky.



The Fogs of Iraq: Post-War



In my opinion, it is no surprise that the majority of American casualties have occurred since the fall of Baghdad and the end of major combat operations. Post-war Iraq was bound to be quite difficult. Compared with the pre-war period or the period of combat operations, post-war Iraq comes much closer to resembling Vietnam. In Vietnam, our success ultimately depended on our ability to establish a local government that could provide security and stability. In Iraq, we arrived at the same point only after the statue of Saddam Hussein was toppled.



The quote with which I began this essay was a scene in Halberstam's book from late in the Johnson Administration, in which an aging retired general asks the Vice-President of the United States if the American commander in Vietnam ever was given a clearly-defined mission. In post-war Iraq, the mission of U.S. troops becomes less clear with each passing day. This does not mean that they should be withdrawn, but it does imply that we can expect continued challenges to their physical safety and to their morale. As this New York Times story reports, "In nearly 100 interviews and conversations in the last four weeks, soldiers across Iraq expressed a complex set of emotions and sentiments toward their rebuilding mission."



The future of Iraq depends on questions that are largely political and cultural. Can the three major ethnic groups arrive at a peaceful power-sharing arrangement? Can a society where family and tribal ties are still important make the transition to western-style markets and democracy? Will a secular leadership emerge that is strong enough to maintain separation of mosque and state, or is there no one more powerful than the imams? Will Iraq's leaders be sufficiently independent of the United States to bolster Iraqi national pride yet still remain friendly to us? These are issues that are beyond the control of young American troops, notwithstanding our soldiers' well-deserved status as Time's "person of the year." The linguistic and cultural gulf between Americans and Iraqis is so wide that it would seem foolish for any of us in the United States to place any large bet on the shape that Iraqi society will take five years from now.



As a candidate for President in 2000, George Bush expressed scorn for the concept of nation-building. Given America's experience, from the former Soviet Republics to Haiti, his skepticism is well founded. Halberstam's thesis is that in Vietnam the military battles were meaningless, because the nation-building war was always a lost cause.



In Iraq today, most of the fog hangs over the nation-building issues:



* Should elections be held soon, to give Iraqis a sense of "ownership" in their government, or should the country first have a Constitution that guarantees the rights of ethnic minorities?



* Should the United States work with and encourage religious leaders, or should we try to limit their power and instead encourage the formation of secular political parties?



* Should we work with the tradition tribal leaders of Iraq, or will their corruption compromise our values too heavily?



* If we wait too long to turn power over to the Iraqis, will we become hated there? If we turn power over too soon, will the Iraqis lack the skills and training to govern effectively?



It seems to me that these are the choices that America faces in Iraq, and as far as I can tell they are not being discussed outside of the Bush Administration. The nation's op-ed pages seem focused on partisan mudball fights. The Democratic nine dwarfs keep bringing up "internationalization," which strikes me as a solution in search of a problem. Farther out on the left (and even among some "mainstream" Democratic columnists and ex-officials), one hears Chomsky-esque ravings against the military-industrial complex, Halliburton, etc.



One can see the lack of serious discussion at a more grassroots level. James Surowiecki attempted in a comment on Brad DeLong's weblog to elicit some constructive suggestions for Iraq policy. Surowiecki wrote:



"I suppose my real concern is that most of the critics don't have any solutions, that they don't know what to do, not just about Iraq but about Islamic fundamentalist terrorism, and so their fallback position is to talk about what a terrible job Bush is doing, which is true but doesn't really help America right now, nor does it make it likely that Bush will be defeated in November. People are not going to vote Bush out unless they believe that his opponent has a plan to fix Iraq and, more important, a plan to keep them safe. Tax policy, trade policy, the environment, civil liberties: on all these issues Bush's critics (of which I'm often one) offer substantive criticisms and substantive alternatives. But on Iraq, I've heard little, aside from the opposition to the $87 billion to reconstruct Iraq (which would have left Iraq where, exactly?), the insane proposal to force Iraq to borrow the money for its own reconstruction and, of course, the chorus from ANSWER about helping the Baathists resist the colonial occupation. This doesn't cut it."



It seems to me that Surowiecki bent over backwards to try to obtain a reasonable response. You can see for yourself how well it worked (scroll down for Surowiecki's comment and the follow-ups).



Perhaps no one in the press, politics, or the public has anything of substance to say concerning the real issues and choices that we face in Iraq. In that case, the decent thing to do would be to admit that they have not the foggiest idea what they would do differently. But I think in fact there is room for more ideas and opinions.



I believe that there is a lot of potential for things to work out well in Iraq, as this New York Times Magazine story about an Iraqi entrepreneur indicates. However, as Americans try to influence developments in post-war Iraq, we are bound to make some mistakes. And regardless of how wise we might be, ultimately it will be the Iraqis themselves who determine the future of their country. Today, that future is shrouded in the inevitable fog.



The Fog of the Terror War



Even for a war, the fight against Islamist terror seems unusually foggy. Do we know whether our dedicated enemies number in the hundreds or in the hundreds of thousands -- or perhaps even the millions? Do we know whether it is state sponsorship or religious incitement that is more important in creating and sustaining the terrorist movement? Do we know whether greater democracy and economic development will be a salve or an irritant to the moderates?



Years from now, historians might determine that the initial responses to September 11 were all that was needed to efface the capability of the terrorist networks. In retrospect, removing terrorist bases in Afghanistan and taking steps to break up their funding system might turn out to have been sufficient to reduce terrorist attacks down to nuisance levels. If that is the case -- which I think is unlikely -- then the war in Iraq was of no strategic benefit to the United States. We are left only with a justification that it freed the Iraqi people, a rationale which by itself few Americans would consider compelling.



At the other extreme, years from now we may look back and see that the Western and Islamic worlds were headed toward a major collision, in which the September 11 attacks and the Iraq war were merely initial skirmishes. In that case, the world's future will hinge on the outcome of that major collision, not on the war in Iraq.



In between those two extremes are scenarios in which the outcome in Iraq matters. The strategic significance of President Bush's vision for democracy in Iraq is that it represents a model for how he believes that the trend toward Islamic militancy can be stopped.



Recently on TCS, Michael Vlahos suggested that the President's vision and strategy are more ambitious and challenging than is commonly understood. Vlahos implies that we have bitten off more than we can chew. He argues that, "U.S. strategy demands submission to the secular from the moderate Islamist, surrender or death from the radical Islamist, and a 'just fade away' from the current Muslim ruling establishment."



Vlahos raises important issues that are too often ignored in the partisan debates. His thoughts go deeper than the rabid pro- and anti-Bush rhetoric that fills the media.



In Vietnam, there were hawks who argued that Communism would be a disaster for that country. There were doves who argued that we could not build a viable non-Communist state in South Vietnam. Beneath the fog, it turned out that both sides were correct.



In the war against Islamist terror, President Bush has said that victory requires widespread change in the Islamic world. A skeptic could suggest that -- particularly in the stark terms laid out by Vlahos -- the President's goals are unattainable. Both sides could turn out to be right.



To me, it seems clear that the defeat of radical Islamists is important for Americans and for the world. It is at the more tactical level where I believe that debate and discussion are needed, and yet that is where the contributions of the President's opponents are so meager. The segments of America that Surowiecki challenged, including our campus intellectuals and many partisan Democrats, have taken a powder, refusing to engage the issue of terrorism and U.S. strategy with the seriousness it requires. Today, the American left is only clear about its desire to bring down the Bush Administration. Otherwise, they seem to the rest of us to be in the deepest fog of all.




Copyright © 2004 Tech Central Station - www.techcentralstation.com

Story Here!!!!!


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This is...
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Marines Sites & Forums
By R.W. "Dick" Gaines
GySgt USMC (Ret.)
1952-72
Semper Fidelis
~~~~~~~~~~

NOW, THE MARINES

Now, the Marines
January 14, 2004 1:14 am

IN 1960, "The Magnificent Seven," a film about seven gunfighters who for 20 dollars each defend a poor Mexican village from a small army of brutal bandits, premiered. Its true-life sequel came out five years later in South Vietnam's I Corp.

There, groups of 14 Marines (plus one indispensable Navy corpsman) began living day and night in hamlets, training local militia to fight, sharing their privations, and guaranteeing rural Vietnamese that the Viet Cong no longer would confiscate their crops, money, and sons. The "stars" of this production, soon to be restaged in Iraq, quickly knew their worth: The VC offered 10,000 piasters, dead or alive, for any Marine serving in a Combined Action Platoon.

Not only are CAPs returning when Marines this March begin replacing the 82nd Airborne soldiers now stationed in the western part of Iraq's bloody Sunni Triangle. So is the interservice soreheadedness surrounding the program. Some Army officers complain that the Marines' plan--which calls for greater sensitivity to Iraqi customs, the forswearing of heavy ordnance to punish whole towns, and broadcasting the clear message "we're not the Army"--is an implicit criticism of the larger service. It is. Again.

In 1965, Marine commander Gen. Lew Walt, recoiling from the sweeping "search and destroy" missions ordered by his superior, Army Gen. William Westmoreland, said, "The Marines have never felt that the war stands to be won by the grand maneuvers of large forces, by brilliant marshalship in the Tannenberg or Chancellorsville image, but rather in the villages." Westmoreland tolerated, but did not order the Army to mimic, Marine CAPs, which, unlike the Army chief's turbulent strategy, prevented Vietnamese farm families from becoming landless refugees.

CAPs worked in South Vietnam. They actually won hearts and minds, and not just for a day: Vietnam Marine Bing West, a friend of these pages, has written of returning recently to the Vietnamese hamlet where he lived and fought to find lovingly tended shrines to his fallen comrades. As the late Gen. Walt wrote, "Of all our innovations in Vietnam none was more successful, as lasting in effect, or as useful for the future as the Combined Action Program.Increasingly, we became the fish swimming in the sea of people, with the guerrilla flopping on the bank, gasping for air."

Iraq, it's true, may be another kettle of fish altogether. Marine CAPs will not be pitching their bunks in friendly--perhaps not even neutral--villages. Iraq and Vietnam are different places with different histories, religions, and temperaments. By some estimates, a third of Iraqis, disproportionately dwelling in the Sunni Triangle, support outright violence against coalition troops. Can vows of restraint withstand suicide bombings and hate-filled mobs ready to repay benevolence with a bullet in the back?

In his book "Semper Fi Vietnam," military historian Edward Murphy tells the story of Lance Cpl. Miguel Keith, all of 19, a CAP Marine in Quang Ngai Province in 1970 when his hamlet came under ground attack. Though wounded, Keith moved to positions held by village militiamen and directed their fire. Spotting five enemy infiltrators, Keith charged them, killing three and wounding the others. Flattened by a grenade, Keith got up and charged into 25 more attackers, killing four and scattering the rest. He died of his wounds, the last Marine in South Vietnam to earn a Medal of Honor.

Courage enriched by compassion and intelligence--this is what the Marines aim to bring to the war in a different form than any yet employed by an Army unit, however worthy. Who knows? The bandits who would rule Iraq may soon put a price of 10,000 dinars on the heads of CAP members. In this generation's shadowy war, that would be a magnificent measure of progress.
http://www.freelancestar.com/News/FLS/2004/012004/01142004/1230682
http://www.freelancestar.com/News/FLS/2004/012004/01142004/1230682
Copyright 2001 The Free Lance-Star Publishing Company.

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This is...
Gunny G's...
GLOBE and ANCHOR
Marines Sites & Forums
By R.W. "Dick" Gaines
GySgt USMC (Ret.)
1952-72
Semper Fidelis
~~~~~~~~~~

OLDEST LIVIMG WOMAN MARINE?

Methodist Oaks resident believes she's oldest surviving Marine veteran

As one of the first women to join the Marine Corps, Edith Ferris commanded platoons and served as a transportation officer. She had worked her way up to captain when the Marines discharged all women in the early 1950s.
By LEE HENDREN, T&D Staff Writer

Today as The Methodist Oaks celebrates its 50th anniversary, making it one of the oldest retirement communities in South Carolina, one of its residents is marking another feat of longevity.

Edith Ferris says she believes she is the oldest surviving woman veteran of the U.S. Marine Corps.

Sixty-one years ago, World War II raged across the globe and all of the U.S. military branches were under pressure to rapidly multiply their numbers.

The Army created the Women's Army Corps or WACs. The Navy started the Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service, or WAVES. And the Coast Guard established the SPARS.

For a brief period during World War I, the Marine Corps enrolled a little more than 500 women in clerical positions at its headquarters in Washington.

When the Marine Corps announced on Feb. 13, 1943, that it would admit women, its commandant, Lt. Gen. Thomas Holcomb, balked at creating a "reserve" force with a cute acronym.

"They don't have a nickname, and they don't need one," Holcomb said in a 1944 interview with LIFE magazine. "They get their basic training in a Marine atmosphere at a Marine post. They inherit the traditions of Marines. They are Marines."

That approach was appealing to Ferris, who joined the Marines on March 23, 1943. "I was the first one in Michigan," she said.

Born in Detroit, Ferris graduated from high school and attended college for a period of time before leaving to work in a store. She married Edward James Leppan, and they built a house in Royal Oak and settled down to rear a family.

But fate had other plans for this feisty lady. After three miscarriages, doctors told her she would not be able to bear children. This was crushing news to both her and her husband.

So she decided to join several other members of her family in the military. "My oldest brother was in the Seabees," she said, but that work didn't appeal to her.

"My brother, the master sergeant in the Marines, asked would I like to join the Army or the Navy? I said, 'What about the Marines?' He said they didn't have women Marines at that time," Ferris recalled.

Later, "I read in the paper that they were having ladies in the Marines. I went down to the recruiting station, and they said, yes, in February, and I said, 'Sign me up!'"

"I didn't know what I was doing," she said with a laugh. "I was discontented about not having babies."

"They said, 'You're the first woman Marine in Michigan,'" Ferris said. "They said, 'Is your husband coming?' My husband went with me (to the recruitment office) but they said they couldn't accept him because he had a perforated eardrum. I hadn't known it."

So "he was a civilian, and I was in the Marines, and I couldn't get out because I couldn't get pregnant," Ferris said. Her husband eventually filed for divorce, citing Ferris' military obligations.

Ferris and the other earliest women Marines underwent basic training at Hunter College in Bronx, N.Y. "The Navy trained us," she recalled. She was salutatorian of her class.

"I was then sent to Camp Lejeune, N.C., and I got a stripe" and was promoted to platoon sergeant. She was one of just 13 in her class to graduate from Officer Candidate School and received the rank of second lieutenant.

"Then I was a commanding officer of recruits and assistant transportation officer at Cherry Point, N.C.," she said.

Women Marines were not sent overseas during that time. Ferris was promoted to first lieutenant and then to captain before all women were discharged from the Marine Corps in the early 1950s.

"After I got out of the service, I went on the (GI Bill) to Florida State University in Tallahassee, Fla.," where she earned a bachelor of science degree in social work.

After working for two years in Alexandria, Va., she got a scholarship to the College of William and Mary in Williamsburg, Va., where she finished her master's degree.

But her subsequent job involved "little babies," and "it was too emotional and I had to quit," she said.

As an American Red Cross hospital field director for U.S. military services, her postings included New Jersey, Massachusetts, Maryland, Louisiana, New York and Alaska. She also worked for Goodwill Industries in California.

For 11 years she was a rehabilitation counselor in the California Institute for Women, the prison where the infamous "Manson girls" are held. It also houses the Golden State's death row.

Ferris retired and moved to Florida but returned to Washington to supervise the relocation of Vietnamese refugees for the American Red Cross.

After retiring again, Ferris and her recently widowed sister learned about Bradford Village in Santee from an AARP magazine and bought a house there.

Health problems prompted the sisters to move to The Methodist Oaks. Her sister has since passed away, but Ferris maintains a lifestyle as active as her health allows.

An apparent stroke left Ferris with a condition called aphasia. Experts said she would never again be able to speak. Ferris was determined to prove them wrong and has regained much of her ability to speak.

Once a Marine, always a Marine.

T&D Staff Writer Lee Hendren can be reached by e-mail at lhendren@timesanddemocrat.com or by phone at 803-533-5552. Information on the early years of women in the Marine Corps was obtained from the "Military Officer" magazine.

50th anniversary program today

Today at 3 p.m. in the Nancy Freeman Stringer Memorial Chapel, everyone is invited to attend The Methodist Oaks' 50th anniversary celebration program.

United Methodist Bishop Lawrence McCleskey will be the keynote speaker. The Methodist Oaks Choir will perform. The Methodist Oaks will debut its commemorative 50th anniversary video and DVD. An anniversary cake and other refreshments will be served.
http://www.thetandd.com/articles/2004/01/06/news/news1.prt
http://www.thetandd.com/articles/2004/01/06/news/news1.prt




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This is...
Gunny G's...
GLOBE and ANCHOR
Marines Sites & Forums
By R.W. "Dick" Gaines
GySgt USMC (Ret.)
1952-72
Semper Fidelis
~~~~~~~~~~

MARINES OR SOLDIERS -- THE CORPS VS. THE ARMY

National Review online
December 10, 2001

Marines Turned Soldiers

The Corps vs. the Army.

By Mackubin Thomas Owens, professor of strategy and force planning at the Naval War College

The United States Marine Corps is a separate service within the Department of the Navy. Marines traditionally operate "from the sea" in conducting expeditionary tasks. The traditional focus of the Marines — and of its sister service, the United States Navy — has been on the world's littorals. So why were Marines the first major contingent of U.S. conventional ground forces sent into landlocked Afghanistan?

According to some news reports, as well as Internet traffic, this is a topic of great concern among officers of the U.S. Army. According to Katherine McIntire Peters in the issue of Government Executive Magazine dated November 29 ("Marine Deployment Irks Soldiers") the fact that the Marines have carried out what appears to be a textbook Army mission — the seizure of an airfield in a theater of operations far from any shoreline — has "sparked fury among many mid-grade [Army] officers." Many soldiers see the Marine deployment as further evidence that their beloved service has become increasingly irrelevant since the end of the Cold War.

This is an overreaction. There will be plenty for the Army to do, both in Afghanistan and in the phases of the war against terrorism that will follow it. But the episode does illustrate the degree to which the security environment has evolved over the past decade, and the fact that responsiveness, flexibility, and adaptability are the characteristics most necessary in military forces of the future. The Army is adapting, but given what that service was asked to do for 50 years, it has further to go than the other services.

The problem the Army faces is geopolitical. To protect its worldwide interests, the United States must be able to project power globally. But given its geographical position, the United States can project power only by overcoming what the former commandant of the Marine Corps, General Charles Krulak, has called the "tyranny of distance." The tyranny of distance creates a dilemma for ground forces — a tradeoff between rapid strategic deployability on the one hand, and lethality, sustainability, and self-protection on the other. Thus, an airborne unit can deploy more quickly than any other ground force — but it lacks the killing power and sustainability necessary to win once it gets on the ground. On the other hand, an armored unit, though it possesses the latter characteristics, takes a long time to get into the theater of war.

During the Cold War, the United States handled the tyranny of distance problem by identifying the most likely theaters of war and stationing Army and tactical Air Forces there during peacetime, as a deterrent. Of course, the defense of Europe required more forces than the ones already there, so equipment for reinforcing forces was prepositioned in theater. In the event of an emergency, troops would be flown from the continental United States (CONUS) into theater, where they would "marry up" with their equipment. This approach worked as long as we were planning against an identifiable adversary, the Soviet Union, but became less relevant as the security environment became less certain.

On the other hand, the Marines focused during the Cold War on "contingencies," short-fuse emergencies that could arise anytime or anyplace. The Marines effectively sold their role as a flexible, adaptable "force in readiness," ready to respond with tailored, task-organized forces to any crisis across the spectrum of conflict. They evolved from a stress on amphibious assault to a broader understanding of amphibious operations, developing such capabilities as maritime prepositioning and what is now called "operational maneuver from the sea." Marines never claimed to be the only land force necessary, but they did organize and plan to deploy rapidly with a force capable of holding the line until heavier forces could arrive.

As part of this role, the Marines developed an "operational concept" that exploited a flexible Marine organization, the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). An MAGTF combines a command element, a ground-combat element, an air-combat element, and a logistics-support element that can provide a flexible, task-organized force ranging in size from a few hundred Marines to a multi-division, multi-air wing force of over 100,000.

For the Army, the tyranny of distance manifested itself during the Gulf War of 1990-91, when it took the United States nearly six months to deploy the ground-combat power thought necessary to defeat Iraq. The problem only became more acute as time went on.

One response to the tyranny of distance problem was to increase the nation's reliance on airpower. Indeed, airpower advocates seized upon the Gulf War to argue that force planning models were biased in favor of land power. They claimed that the actual conduct of the war demonstrated that land power was now less important than it once had been, and that the balance of U.S. forces should thus be shifted to emphasize airpower.

The war in Afghanistan seems to have refocused attention on land forces. The combination of airpower, special forces, and surrogate ground forces provided by anti-Taliban Afghans has worked extremely well, but it increasingly looks like ultimate success against al Qaeda will require forces beyond SOF on the ground.

So once again, why are "soldiers of the sea" the first conventional ground forces in landlocked Afghanistan? The short answer is that the Marines were in theater and the first ones available to the unified commander, General Tommy Franks. Two Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs), MAGTFs built around a reinforced infantry battalion and a composite aviation squadron, had been moved into the region as the United States made plans to go after al Qaeda in Afghanistan. These units possess substantial tactical mobility and firepower. The most rapidly deployable Army organization — say, a brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division — lacks both.

The fact is that the Army is in a state of transition from a force designed to fight and win the nation's land wars to a more adaptable, more easily deployable force capable of a greater range of missions. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki has been pushing hard to transform the Army, but he faces a difficult job. An important part of the resistance he faces is cultural. According to one online account, posted by a mid-grade Army officer, the Army has "tied itself culturally to the theory and practice of Second-Generation War. This focus centers on requirements to mobilize heavy forces for massive wars of attrition in Western Europe — what the Germans used to call Materialschlacht... [Thus], the Army's high-cost offensive crown jewels — armor and mechanized infantry units — have trouble getting out of Fulda Gap — psychologically as well as physically. One Army wag recently summed up the current situation... 'We have the world's fastest strategically immobile Army.'"

The types of missions for which land forces will be needed in the future will be expeditionary in nature. As former Marine Commandant Gen. Carl Mundy was fond of saying, "'Expeditionary' is not a mission. It's a mindset." The Marines have developed an expeditionary mindset over decades; the Army is only now coming to grips with it. As Tom Ricks wrote in his excellent book, Making the Corps, "The Marines tend to display a kind of funky joie de vivre, especially in the field. In their own parlance, they know how to 'pack their trash,' something the Army is learning slowly and painfully as it too becomes 'expeditionary' in hellholes like Somalia and Haiti."

Whether we like it or not, the United States has embarked on an era of "imperial policing." Although the U.S. does not possess a formal empire, the liberal world order we seek requires that we take the lead in underwriting the global security environment. The Marines have developed the culture and mindset necessary to play a major role in this world. The Army is still working on it. But as Gen. Shinseki admonished those in his service who were not enamored of his transformation plan, "If you dislike change, you're going to dislike irrelevance even more."
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TOP ENLISTED MARINE CITES BAD LAW

Military's care recovery law bad, Marine Corps' top enlisted man says

By James W. Crawley
UNION-TRIBUNE STAFF WRITER

January 4, 2004

Along with duty to country and educational benefits, no-cost medical care for service members and their families is a big reason recruits join the military.

But recruiters don't mention a little-known law that allows the military to garnishee insurance and court settlements from service members and dependents injured in traffic accidents and other nonmilitary calamities.

Even the Marines' top enlisted man, Sgt. Maj. of the Marine Corps John Estrada, wasn't aware.

"We come into the military with the understanding that (medical care) is free, but I found out that it's not really free after all," said Estrada, who has served for 30 years, including tours at all three Marine bases in San Diego County. "They need to tell people when they come in about this law," he said.

As the Corps' sergeant major, Estrada, 48, isn't some anonymous noncom. He is the face of the Marines' 158,000 enlisted men and women.

He advises the Marine Corps commandant, Gen. Michael Hagee, on enlisted issues such as pay, morale and family support services.

But Estrada only learned about the 41-year-old law, called the Medical Care Recovery Act, when the Navy filed a claim in November on insurance proceeds from a May traffic accident in which his wife, Midge Estrada, was nearly killed by a wayward driver. She suffered brain damage and spent more than two weeks in a coma.

The Navy wants the proceeds from Estrada's and the other driver's auto insurance policies – an estimated $100,000 total.

The money would help reimburse the Navy for his wife's hospital bills, including emergency brain surgery, weeks in intensive care, a military air ambulance flight from Sacramento to Washington, and physical and occupational therapy. The bill could reach $1 million or more for care that could last for years.

"They're trying to get a quarter from me to pay off a million-dollar bill," Estrada said, suggesting that any insurance payout would have little effect on the Navy's budget but a huge impact on his finances.

He said it's money the family needs to take care of expenses that military benefits don't cover, such as baby-sitting, nonmedical costs and a replacement vehicle for the car destroyed in the accident.

Estrada, who was the top enlisted man in the 3rd Marine Air Wing at Miramar Marine Corps Air Station until June, said he is taking up the fight not so much for his wife but to inform other enlisted men and women and their families about the law.

"If a person in my position is unaware of the law, there's a lot of others who aren't aware of that law," he said.

Millions have been collected for reimbursements.

Last year, the Navy obtained nearly $11 million in reimbursement from insurance claims and court decisions that would have gone to sailors, Marines and their dependents. Over the past two years, the total reimbursements were about $21.5 million.

"It's an $11 million-a-year business for the Navy," said Pat Leonard, deputy director of the claims, investigation and tort litigation division of the service's Office of the Judge Advocate General.

Leonard said the collection effort saves taxpayers because most of the recovered money is funneled back to the military to cover medical care. About $1.8 million is used to pay attorneys, staff and expenses at three claims offices, including one in San Diego, that process reimbursement requests, she added.

The attorneys file claims for reimbursement against insurance companies. The government also can join lawsuits filed by an injured service member. It does not dock anyone's pay or bank accounts.

During fiscal year 2003, which ended Sept. 30, the Navy filed 8,796 claims involving Marines and sailors.

The Navy would not comment on specific cases, citing privacy.

The Army and Air Force also collect medical reimbursements, known as affirmative claims in military legalese.

Last year, the Pentagon collected a total of $27.6 million.

On average, the military collected $1,410 per case that involved recovery. The Navy had the highest collection average, $1,642 per case, last year.

"Not in every case do we send a demand and they send us a check," Leonard said. "Sometimes we get a check. Sometimes we get a check in two or three years."

In most cases, the Navy settles for less than the hospital bill, she said.

Estrada and others may have little recourse, said attorneys familiar with the law.

"It's completely fair," said Gene Fidell, a Washington attorney who represents service members. "The government has paid hard cash to run the base hospitals and pay doctors, so why shouldn't they go forward and try to get some of those expenses back?"

While Fidell agrees with government policy to seek money from the at-fault driver's insurance, he said it doesn't seem fair to also seek proceeds from a service member's own insurance policy, such as in Estrada's case.

"Legally, the government has the right, but this is not the type of situation the law envisioned," Fidell said. He suggested that the law should not hurt a service member's financial situation.

2003 was a trying year for the Estrada family.

The sergeant major served in Kuwait and Iraq with Miramar-based Marines during the winter and spring. As the fighting subsided in Iraq, Estrada was selected in April for the top enlisted post.

Midge Estrada, his wife of 13 years and a former Marine officer, was waiting on the tarmac when he returned to Miramar on May 13.

On May 15, she flew back to Sacramento, where she and their two preteen children were living. As she was driving home from the airport, a pickup truck rammed the rear of her 1994 BMW, catapulting it sideways into the back of another pickup.

While everyone else walked away from the collision, Midge Estrada was left in a coma, suffering severe head trauma, a collapsed right lung and other serious injuries. For days, doctors feared she would die.

Slowly, she started coming out of the coma.

Since May, the 39-year-old has had to relearn how to talk, read and walk. She still has trouble remembering things. Her hair is finally growing back over the scars from brain surgery. She'll have a year or more of additional therapy, but may never be the same person she was before the accident.

"It's a tough injury to get better from," she said recently. "I think I'm getting better."

Meanwhile, Estrada has been trying to care for his wife while holding a high-profile job that places hard demands on his time, with frequent travel and long hours at work. Family and friends have helped at home with Midge and the children.

Estrada's concern about his family's welfare escalated in December, when his attorney called to say the Navy had placed a lien on any insurance settlement from his wife's case.

"I feel like we've had insult added to injury," Estrada said. "Haven't we suffered enough?"

He added that no one has returned his calls seeking information about the claim.

"I'm not blaming the military," Estrada said. "We just have a bad law."

James W. Crawley:
(619) 542-4559; jim.crawley@uniontrib.com




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THE MARINES: WHERE WE CAME FROM

EXCERPT:

Part One: Introduction to the Marine Corps
Chapter 1: Origins of a Mission
In a sense, Marines may be said to have existed in ancient times when the Phoenicians, and subsequently the Greeks and Romans, placed men aboard their ships for the specific purpose of fighting, in contrast to the crews who navigated them and the rowers who propelled them. However, Marines in the modern sense date to Seventeenth Century England where, in 1664, a regiment of ground troops was raised specifically for duty with the fleet as well as ashore. This unit bore the somewhat ponderous title: "Duke of York and Albany's Maritime Regiment of Foot." Over a period of many decades of expansion and evolution, during much of which nobody knew for certain whether it belonged to the Army or the Navy, this basic unit developed into the corps known today as the Royal Marines.

By the time of the American Revolution, the status of the British Marines had jelled firmly. Thus, when the American Colonies revolted and began setting up their own armed services, they modeled these much along the lines of the similar components of the mother country, these being the forms with which they were most familiar and which suited them best temperamentally. This was true of the Continental Marines and to an even greater degree of the Marine Corps, reactivated under the Constitution in 1798.

In the days of wooden, sail-propelled ships the functions of the Marines became well defined. At sea they kept order and were responsible for internal security. In combat they became the ship's small-arms fighters: sniping from the fighting tops, and on deck spearheading boarding parties in close action or repelling enemy boarders. Ashore they guarded naval installations, both at home and abroad, and upon occasion fought on land beside Army components. Amphibious-wise, they were available as trained landing parties, either to seize positions on hostile shores, or to protect the lives and property of nationals in foreign countries. Both the British and U.S. Marines have seen much such service.

At the time of this writing the Marine Corps is 181 years old, according to its own reckoning, though its service has not been continuous. Marines celebrate their Corps' birthday on 10 November, this being the date in the year 1775 when the Continental Congress authorized the raising of two battalions of Marines for the Continental service. The scanty records extant show nothing to indicate that those battalions were actually raised, but many Marines were recruited for service on board the ships of the infant Navy where they performed creditably in all the major sea actions of the Revolutionary War, staged two important amphibious landings in the Bahamas, and ashore participated in the Trenton-Princeton campaign under General Washington.

The Continental Marines, like the Navy and all but a minuscule detachment of the Army, passed out of existence following the close of the Revolutionary War. However,

--3--

foreign pressures brought the Navy back into existence in 1798 under the recently adopted Constitution, and on 11 July of that year the Marine Corps was reactivated as a separate service within the naval establishment.

Since that date Marines have fought in every official war the United States has had--and scores of obscure affairs that lacked official blessing but in which, to quote the eminent Marine writer, John W. Thomason, Jr., "...a man can be killed as dead as ever a chap was in the Argonne."1 They have served as strictly naval troops, both ashore and afloat, and participated in extended land operations under Army command, notably in the Creek-Seminole Indian Wars of the 1830's, the Mexican War, both World Wars, and in Korea.

All over the world, Britain's Royal Marines were seeing much the same type of service. For a century or more the courses of the two corps ran parallel, and they were as functionally alike as it is possible for any two military organizations to be. Individual members of these services had so many interests in common that, as one British writer put it, they had a tendency to "chum up"2 when ships of the two nations put in to the same ports. Even the present U.S. Marine emblem (adopted in 1868) derives from that of the Royal Marines; though at a glance they appear entirely different, the basic motifs of both are the fouled anchor and globe: the Eastern Hemisphere for the British, the Western for the U.S. Much in common existed at top level, as well, and over the years the two organizations developed a very close and most cordial relationship that exists to this day, despite the strange evolutionary divergence that set in between them.3

The transition of navies from sail to steam began evolutionary developments which profoundly altered the nature of all shipboard duties, and temporarily threatened both corps with extinction. From this the Royal Marines emerged burdened with a miscellany of often incongruous duties never envisioned in the old days, and considerably emasculated by lack of a single mission of overriding importance. That the effect on the U.S. Marines was precisely the reverse resulted from the fundamental difference in the problems facing the two nations which required U.S. Marines to carve out a special mission for themselves, though they traveled a long, uneven road in bringing this to full fruition.

The basic problem that confronted the early steam navies was that of obtaining fuel. Sail-propelled men-of-war, on which all naval experience and tradition up to the time was based, could operate at sea almost indefinitely, putting in only to replenish provisions and water, readily available at nearly any port of call anywhere in the world. But sufficient coal to support large-scale steamship operations could be obtained only from well stocked bases, and a fleet's operating radius thus became limited by the location of such bases. If an enemy lay beyond that radius, the fleet might as well be chained to a post so far as getting at

--4--

him was concerned, unless the source of supply could be projected farther in his direction.

To the British Empire, on which "the sun never sets," this posed no serious problem; it had, or could build, all the bases it needed without leaving its own territory. But the United States, with few outlying possessions, had genuine cause for concern. In order to give the fleet significant operating range in the Pacific, the Navy in 1878 set up a coaling station in Samoa, and in 1887 the government concluded a treaty with Hawaii permitting the establishment of another at Pearl Harbor.

But the United States had no deep-seated interest in the Far East during this era, and no serious apprehension of an attack from that direction. The Navy's principal concern lay in the possibility of being obliged to enforce the Monroe Doctrine in the Caribbean or South Atlantic. As early as 1880, far-sighted naval officers began turning their thoughts toward this mission. The cost of maintaining permanent bases in those areas would have been prohibitive, so the problem boiled down to devising a plan for seizing advanced bases when and where strategy dictated their need and developing these as quickly as possible to withstand attack. The scattered, understrength U.S. Army of that era could not supply sufficient trained ground troops on the short notice necessary to make such operations effective, so the Navy faced the problem of developing ground troops of its own for service with the fleet.4

It would seem, particularly with benefit of today's hindsight, that the Marine Corps would be the logical choice for the development of this mission. However, this was not so apparent at the time. Marines had never participated in this type of operation on anything resembling the scale envisioned, and they comprised a very small unit as compared to the bluejackets. One school of thought contended that the advanced base function should be performed entirely by Navy personnel under command of naval officers, in the interests of unity and other considerations.5 The controversy, strictly on the theoretical level, waxed warm and sometimes acrimonious, giving rise at length to one of those perennial efforts to eliminate the Marines altogether.6

However, the advent of the Spanish-American War found the Navy wholly unprepared to cope with the advanced base problem. It was the Marine Corps that promptly organized an expeditionary battalion, including its own artillery component, for the seizure of Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in order to enable the U.S. Fleet to operate indefinitely in the Caribbean waters. At Key West this unit underwent training in minor tactics, basic weapons, and musketry, and then landed in the target area on 10 June 1898, ten days before the first Army troops arrived off the coast of Cuba. There the Marines quickly secured a beachhead and successfully defended it against a numerically superior enemy.

--5--


CONTINENTAL MARINES present a stirring sight as they charge in this symbolic painting of Revolutionary fighting by H. Charles McBarron, Jr. (USMC 304045)


MARINES OF HUNTINGTON'S BATTALION, first troops ashore in Cuba in 1898, captured Guantanamo Bay, used thereafter as an American naval base. (USMC 4982)

-6---

So expeditiously and efficiently was this operation conducted that its contribution to the speedy and decisive culmination of the war would be difficult to evaluate. This also greatly strengthened the Marine Corps' claim to the Navy's amphibious mission, a claim that gained still further strength by Admiral Dewey's subsequent statement that if a similar Marine component had served with his fleet at Manila Bay, the painful and protracted Philippine Insurrection might have been avoided.

The Spanish-American War signalized emergence of the United States as a world power. Possession of the Philippines caused the Navy to reappraise the whole Far East situation. The USS Charleston, convoying Army troops to Manila, paused en route to seize the Spanish island of Guam to serve as an advanced coaling station,7 and annexation of Hawaii followed shortly.8 Additional advanced bases were established in the Philippines themselves as soon as the situation permitted.

This increasing consciousness of the Navy's widespread commitments and responsibilities brought about the evolutionary developments which culminated in the early 1940's in the amphibious assault doctrines and techniques "which finally made possible what Major General J.F.C. Fuller has called 'the most far-reaching tactical innovation of [World War II].'"9

--7--

Table of Contents Previous Chapter (Foreword/Preface) * Next Chapter (2)

Footnotes:
[1] Capt J. W. Thomason, Jr., Fix Bayonets! (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955 ed.), xiv.

[2] LtCol M. Rose, RMA, A Short History of the Royal Marines (Deal, England: Depot Royal Marines, 1911), 22.

[3] LtCol R.D. Heinl, Jr., "What Happened to the Royal Marines?," USNI Proceedings, February 1949, 169.

[4] E.B. Potter (ed), The United States and World Sea Power (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1955), 577-578, hereinafter cited as U.S. & Sea Power.

[5] For detailed discussion of this controversy, see W.H. Russell, "The Genesis of FMF Doctrine: 1879-1899," MC Gazette, April-July 1951.

[6] LtCol R.D. Heinl, Jr., "The Cat with More than Nine Lives," USNI Proceedings, June 1954.

[7] Seizure of Guam required no landing force. The Spanish governor had not learned about the declaration of war and mistook the token naval bombardment for a courtesy salute and hurried out to the Charleston to apologize for his inability to return it for lack of ammunition. He promptly surrendered the island upon being apprised of the facts.

[8] Prior to the Spanish War, the question of the annexation of Hawaii had been under negotiation off and on for many years between that government and the United States. In a treaty signed in 1875, Hawaii had been declared "an American sphere of influence."

[9] Quoted in U.S. & Sea Power, 587.

Transcribed and formatted for HTML by Patrick Clancey, HyperWar Foundation

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This is...
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Semper Fidelis
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ANOTHER TOUGH MARINE!

Marine with prosthetic limb jumps into history books
Submitted by: Headquarters Marine Corps
Story Identification Number: 2003121810733
Story by Cpl. Isaac Pacheco

NOTE:
See a similar story, ONE TOUGH MARINE!, S/Sgt Donald Hamblen USMC, in the notes, book Reviews below this article.
-GyG


FORT BENNING ARMY BASE, Ga.(Dec. 18, 2003) -- High above the eastern Alabama countryside, the deafening roar of a C-130's engines drowns out the instructor's urgent commands. The shadowy figures sitting behind him respond instinctively. In the dim light, the instructor can see only a few of their taut, weathered faces.

Focused on the task at hand, with fearless and eager expressions on their faces, the shadowy figures emerge from the darkness. They've blocked out all distractions and the only thing they respond to is the angry man in front of them whose insistence on perfection they've grudgingly come to admire.

Upon rising to their feet, more than 20 of them sardine back-to-back against the bright red bench that runs the length of the aircraft. They feel ready. After all, this is why they've trained for the past three weeks.

The plane makes a steep left turn and lights flash on above the open doors on each side of the fuselage. One minute to go. A wave of glove-covered hands reaches upward for the yellow static lines. The front man in the line turns and shouts commands over his shoulder through the rushing air, "Chalk 5, all clear!"

"Chalk 5, all clear!" the instructor echoes.

The lights above the doors flash green. The instructor, who has remained fairly passive up to this point, explodes.

"Get out! Go, go, go!" he bellows as he pushes each body out of the plane.

As each jumper touched the sky, his pack springs to life releasing a life-saving parachute.

Behind the plane, a trail of giant green blossoms can be seen floating gracefully to the ground.

In addition to being yet another successful day on the job for the U.S. Army Basic Airborne Course students, this jump turned out to be history in the making. This was the first class to graduate a Marine who had been retained on active duty with a prosthetic limb.

Sgt. Christopher Chandler, an Aurora, Colo., native, lost his left leg from below the knee Dec. 16, 2001, when he stepped on a land mine while providing security for an explosives ordnance disposal unit in Kandahar, Afghanistan. He was one of the first service members injured in the Global War on Terrorism, but unlike some of his wounded counterparts, he refused to let the accident diminish his resolve.

"I didn't have time to feel sorry for myself," Chandler, a maintenance technician for Headquarters Company, Marine Forces Atlantic, explained. "While I was in the hospital, other injured veterans visited me. I saw that compared to them I had nothing to complain about."

It's been said that the truest test of one's character is not what he does with success but what he makes of defeat. For generations, the Marine Corps has bred recruits with this type of bravado and instilled the courage in its warriors to move forward when those around them have faltered. In keeping with this ethos, Chandler stepped up to the challenge of jump school in the face of seemingly impossible odds. He jumped into the history books Dec. 10, becoming the only service member retained on active duty to graduate the course with a prosthetic leg.

"I think any obstacle in life can be overcome if you believe in yourself," Chandler exclaimed. "I hope this will make it easier for other people with prosthetics who want to go through (jump school) next time. As long as they won't be extra baggage, and they can pull their own weight and accomplish the mission. Hopefully, they won't have to put up with as much as I had to."

Chandler not only rose to the challenge but also exceeded even his own expectations when he was selected as the class' noncommissioned officer honor graduate.

"He captures the heart and soul of what it means to be a U.S. Marine," said Lt. Col. Kirk Rice, commander, Marine Corps Detachment, Fort Benning. "I mean he exemplifies all of our core values--honor, courage, and commitment. This is a courageous young man. He fought to be retained on active duty and asked for a chance to come to airborne school as a reenlistment bonus."

Chandler faced many challenges and trials during the course of his airborne training revolution, but none so rigorous as the medical boards he faced to stay on active duty.

"After his injury and the loss of his leg, Chandler had to go before a Naval review. They had to make a decision as to whether he should be retained on active duty," Rice explained. "He was able to demonstrate to the Physical Evaluation Review Board that he was fit for return to full duty with no limitations. I think his success will open the door for the retention of service members who have lost a limb. It clearly demonstrates that given certain conditions, they can and should be left on active duty."

Chandler had to undergo another battery of physicals, paperwork and interviews before the airborne school would accept him. Yet, he was able to keep his sense of humor throughout the ordeal.

"Obviously, the school was going to ask questions because they were concerned about my safety and the safety of the other students," Chandler explained. "They wanted to know if I was even capable of completing the tasks they had for me. I figured I had an advantage. After all, I have one less ankle to break. Running everywhere was the hardest part for me. I don't really like to run. The other guys in my class really motivated me to keep going."

One classmate said Chandler's motivation came from within and spread to the people around him.

"I was in Kandahar with him when he had his accident, and this is the first time I've seen him since then," said Sgt. Ryan Scheucher, platoon sergeant, 2nd Intelligence Battalion, II Marine Expeditionary Force. "If you'd known him before the accident, what he's doing right now would come as no surprise. Both in uniform and out, he's always just been one of those guys who just shuts up and gets the job done. If anything, since his accident I see a little more fire in his eyes. He gets up and he goes. He doesn't do anything to skyline himself or to showboat. If it's in the scope of his duty he just does it."

Chandler's enthusiasm and tireless commitment inspired many of his classmates and set the standard for them to follow.

"The first time I even realized he had a prosthetic leg was during one of our PT (physical training) sessions, and he was just smoking these little 18 year olds out there," said Air Force Staff Sgt. Brian Mayer, Special Operations Command Fort Bragg, N.C. "He's an inspiration because you have all these perfectly healthy people who wash out and quit while he stays in and makes it. That's a real testament to his character."

Other jump school students credited Chandler with helping them make it through the course when they were struggling.

He motivated me because at first I felt kind of down and I didn't like the course because it was so hard, but then I saw that he was doing it with only one leg and that inspired me and let me know that I could do this," said Army Sgt. Fatima Hickman, Company B, 203rd Infantry, 4th Support Bn., here. "He could have done anything else but he chose to continue in the military and to go forth with what he wants to do. He's not letting his prosthetic leg stop him from being the Marine he wants to be."

And what did Chandler have to say to his detractors; to the people who said an amputee would never make it through the school.

"I don't have to say anything to people who said I couldn't make it," he retorted. "I just graduated."
-30-

Photos included with story:
Mentally preparing for his final jump, Sgt. Christopher Chandler grabs hold of his static line and awaits the go signal from his instructor .
Photo by: Cpl. Isaac Pacheco

Lt. Col. Kirk Rice, commanding officerof Marine Detachment Fort Benning, pins on Sgt. Christopher Chandler's hard-earned jump wings during the drop zone graduation ceremony. Photo by: Lance Cpl. Kevin J. Ridlon


Text version of story is attached below:

SERGEANT CHANDLER.txt

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And... it has been done before--guess what?
By another Marine!

Re Donald Hamblen USMC

Editorial Reviews


From Publishers Weekly
During a parachute-training jump at Camp Pendleton, Calif., in 1962, Marine Sergeant Hamblen became entangled in high-tension wires; though he survived electrocution, Hamblen's left leg had to be amputated. Facing a medical discharge and the end of a career he loved, he resolved to overcome his handicap and rehabilitate himself back to active duty. The story of how he managed to pass the demanding Physical Readiness Test, which finishes with a punishing three-mile run, is searing. Returning to full-duty status in 1963, Hamblen became the first Marine to be sent into combat wearing a prosthesis. He served 30 consecutive months in Vietnam as a reconnaissance specialist and adviser, taking part in more than 80 missions, half of them inside North Vietnam. Hamblen retired in 1970 after 20 years of service, and is now a professional hunting guide. His involving autobiography, written with Norton ( Force Recon Diary , 1970), also includes a fine account of his experiences as a rifleman and sniper during the Korean War. An inspiring story of general interest. Photos.
Copyright 1993 Reed Business Information, Inc. --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.


From Library Journal
In 1962, during a routine reconnaissance jump, Staff Sergeant Hamblen's parachute was blown off course and into high tension lines at Camp Pendleton. He never lost consciousness, and doctors were amazed that he survived. Five days later his leg was amputated below the knee. Hamblen immediately set out to prove to everyone that he could stay in the Marines. In 1965, he volunteered for service in Vietnam, training teams of Vietnamese for clandestine missions. He served for 30 months and was shot twice in North Vietnam. As far as is known, he is the only Marine to have gone into combat with a prosthesis; by his extraordinary example, he served as an inspiration to other badly wounded soldiers in hospitals. He demonstrated his courage, spirit, and self-determination to overcome all obstacles. Recommended for Vietnam War collections.
- Michael Coleman, Regional Lib. for the Blind and Physically Handicapped, Montgomery, Ala.
Copyright 1993 Reed Business Information, Inc. --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.


From Booklist
This is the plainly told but powerful story of an exceptionally determined human being. Sergeant Hamblen, who had joined the Marines in 1950, fought and was wounded in Korea before joining the elite reconnaissance units and qualifying as both scuba diver and parachutist. In 1962, he lost the lower part of his left leg to injuries sustained when his parachute became tangled in high-tension power lines. In spite of this, he requested and was allowed to return to full active duty with reconnaissance units, served more than two years in Vietnam, and has been a professional hunting guide since his retirement in 1970. Told with the assistance of the author of Force Recon Diary, 1969 and Force Recon Diary, 1970, Hamblen's story eloquently bespeaks the understated courage as well as the esprit de corps of the U.S. Marines. Roland Green --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.


From Kirkus Reviews
Stand-up, anecdotal, typical reminiscences of one of the Corps' all-time tough guys. Putting his career in historical perspective, and writing with fellow retired Marine Norton, Hamblen--a career Marine enlisted man--relates his adventures during and after the Korean War and in Vietnam. As a Maine farm boy, the author knew rough living, so it wasn't surprising that he was more prepared for the hellish experience of boot camp than were many of his peers. As a PFC, Hamblen was sent to Korea as a replacement. The conflict had stagnated into trench warfare, but the author made his mark as a sniper and in other ways. His memoirs of Korea are detailed, and, here, he gives what's arguably the most underpublicized war in American history some varnish. Several years later, looking for new challenges, Hamblen joined the elite force recon--the Marine Corps equivalent of the SEALs and the Green Berets--but, in 1962, he parachuted on to some high-tension power lines and lost his left leg. How Hamblen responded to this accident makes his book's title crystal clear: Recovering, he not only remained in the service but was among four Marines who were accepted into SOG (the supersecret Vietnam War Studies and Observation Group). SOG teams typically operated behind enemy lines all over Southeast Asia (Cambodia, Laos, North Vietnam, even China), kidnapping NVA officers, conducting sabotage raids, and gathering intelligence. Unfortunately, this portion of the author's memoir cries out for far greater detail: Hamblen glosses over Vietnam in 60 pages. A mere hint of a fascinating life. But Hamblen refuses to name the names of guys who back-stabbed him, and his recounting lacks the smell of cordite, the sound of guns, the cries of the dying and wounded. -- Copyright ©1993, Kirkus Associates, LP. All rights reserved. --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.


Ingram
A retired Marine tells of being the only American soldier who ever went into combat wearing an artificial limb and his experiences on the battlefields of Vietnam. Reprint. PW


Inside Flap Copy
"Searing . . . An inspiring story." Publishers Weekly.
On September 21, 1962, U.S. Marine Staff Sergeant Donald N. Hamblen's life changed forever. During a routine parachute jump, Hamblen suffered injuries that cost him his leg. With most people, this would be the end of the story. But for this tough marine, it was only the beginning. An amazing story of courage, spirit, and self-determination . . . of a marine who fought the toughest battle of all -- and won.


Book Description
"Searing . . . An inspiring story." Publishers Weekly.

On September 21, 1962, U.S. Marine Staff Sergeant Donald N. Hamblen's life changed forever. During a routine parachute jump, Hamblen suffered injuries that cost him his leg. With most people, this would be the end of the story. But for this tough marine, it was only the beginning. An amazing story of courage, spirit, and self-determination . . . of a marine who fought the toughest battle of all -- and won.

READER REVIEWS...

1-6 of 6
Spotlight Reviews

7 of 8 people found the following review helpful:

More Spies, September 21, 2000
Reviewer: ra doyle (see more about me) from South Carolina
Once again we have the real heroes, all deep behind the enemy lines. I guess myself and my Sergeant Major buddy here in Beaufort were the only mud Marines in Vietnam as everyone else was in recon or sog. Hamblen states that all the 62 "missions" ( behind the lines- whereever that was)are no longer classified and that is why he is talking about them. Well Major Norton, just produce the evidence and you can prove your case and stop slamming your questioners. I find it rather strange that all the Vietnamese we sent undercover into North Vietnam were captured and executed yet a one legged caucasian came and went 62 times without a hitch. How about a book about that? RA Doyle USMC retired.

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Customer Reviews



0 of 2 people found the following review helpful:

rayjoy@ipa.net, July 3, 2000
Reviewer: roadrunner6 (see more about me) from De Queen, Ar. United States
A great book about a courageous man. I had to force myself to put the book down in order to get some sleep at night. As with all his other books Bruce did a very good job of getting the true picture of this man's life and courage. Roadrunner 6 out

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0 of 2 people found the following review helpful:

rayjoy@ipa.net, July 3, 2000
Reviewer: roadrunner6 (see more about me) from De Queen, Ar. United States
To me this book is an outstanding, reader's book. It kept me glued to 1st Sgt Hamblen's exploits all through the book. I had to force myself to put it down so I could get some sleep at night. But then I expected no less since Bruce Norton was involved in writting this book.

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3 of 7 people found the following review helpful:

Let The Truth Be known!, February 12, 2000
Reviewer: Victor Karkos from North Carolina
I was in Vietnam with Don Hamblen, from 1966 - 1967. His story, One Tougfh Marine, is totally accurate and factual. B. G. Burkett and Glenna Whitley never spoke to Hamblen when they were writing their book, and LtGen. B. Trainor was never Don Hamblen's CO. In fact, Trainor has never met Don Hamblen, ever. Pat Carothers was there, but he was considered by many of us to be a poor excuse for an officer. He wrote himself up for several personal awards (a Silver Star and a Purple Heart) and the troops despised him for being a one-way phony. When people write books they should have credibility and KNOW what they are writing about. None of these four bums could carry Don Hamblen's pack across the street. Hamblen is genuine, they are not. Burkett and Whitley have no credibility after "ghost writing" their work. Veteran's should know the truth about these four bums. In my opinion, Hamblen has more class than to lower himself to their level.

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Donald Hamblen certainly appears to be the ideal Marine!, March 5, 1999
Reviewer: A reader from Columbia, South Carolina
Starting out in his rural home in Maine, in the thirties, Sgt Hamblen tells his extraordinary story in a matter of fact way. I do not think Sgt. Hamben's purpose was to boast when he wrote this book, but rather to tell the truth about what the Marine Corps is all about- Honor, Courage, Commitment- just like the poster says. Sgt. Hamblen is a man that was lucky enough to fall in love with his career and he had the courage enough to fight for it when it apeared to be in danger. I think this individual would be a fine role model for any of today's youth and for the youth of many generations too come.

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This is the best military Bio that I have read ever, December 3, 1998
Reviewer: An Amazon.com Customer
About a very Modivated Marine who lost his leg in a parachuting accident when he hit two electrical. It would have killed any normal person but he was in such good shape that it only burned him really bad to the point that doctors had to amputate his left leg under the knee. He was determaned to return to activ duty and it took more strong will to do this than most people would do to survive. --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title

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1-6 of 6

The above from Amazon.com
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ADDENDUM...
ADDENDUM...

The Best Revenge

December 23, 2003
by Tom Kovach

On 16 December 2001, while on a dangerous assignment in Kandahar, Afghanistan, a young Marine named Christopher Chandler stepped on a land mine and lost the lower portion of his left leg. He was on a detail with an explosives ordinance disposal (EOD) unit. In civilian lingo, EOD guys are the “bomb squad”.

Almost exactly two years later, on the 10th of this month, now-Sergeant Chandler got his revenge — by “living well”, as the saying goes.

Chandler’s version of living well, however, also happened to make history. You see, Chris got his revenge by becoming the first military member in American history to be awarded Airborne wings while wearing a prosthetic limb.

Jumping out of the C-130 at Fort Benning was the end of a lengthy battle — against his injury, and against the Physical Evaluation Review Board. He was rated by the PERB as fit to return to full duty, “with no limitations”. Although that is quite a feat for anyone that has lost a limb — even if one’s duty is a sit-down job in a civilian office — it is a daunting task for a Marine. It means that, among other things, Chandler has demonstrated his ability to run at least three miles within strict time limits, and perform other strenuous physical challenges. Airborne School is full of physical challenges.

Lt. Col. Kirk Rice, commanding officer of Marine Detachment Fort Benning, pins on Sgt. Christopher Chandler's jump wings during the drop zone graduation ceremony.

(U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Kevin J. Ridlon)

The popular television show JAG has a character, Lt. Bud Roberts, who also lost a lower leg in a land mine explosion in Afghanistan and returned to active duty. But, Roberts is fictional, he is a lawyer, and the show has mentioned that he has duty restrictions. Chandler is real, he is a Marine, his duty in the Corps is hazardous, and he has no restrictions. The TV show does give a small glimpse, however, into the challenges of a life such as Chandler’s. Those challenges are faced with gusto, as described by fellow graduates at Fort Benning. They described his attitude as an inspiration. In a Marine Corps public affairs interview, Chandler explained the examination given to him by the staff before being allowed to enter Airborne training. "They wanted to know if I was even capable of completing the tasks they had for me. I figured I had an advantage. After all, I have one less ankle to break.”

Air Force Staff Sgt. Brian Mayer, from US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) at Fort Bragg, NC, said, “He's an inspiration because you have all these perfectly healthy people who wash out and quit while he stays in and makes it. That's a real testament to his character.”

“I was in Kandahar with him when he had his accident, and this is the first time I've seen him since then,” said Sgt. Ryan Scheucher, platoon sergeant, 2nd Intelligence Battalion, II Marine Expeditionary Force. “If you'd known him before the accident, what he's doing right now would come as no surprise. Both in uniform and out, he's always just been one of those guys who just shuts up and gets the job done. If anything, since his accident I see a little more fire in his eyes.”

Many people have been retained on active duty with prosthetics (I met one when I was in the orthopedic ward at Walter Reed). Some people even continue to jump with prosthetics. But, Chandler is the first person to go into the school with an artificial leg and complete the rigorous training. “I think any obstacle in life can be overcome if you believe in yourself," Chandler explained. "I hope this will make it easier for other people with prosthetics who want to go through [jump school] next time. As long as they won't be extra baggage, and they can pull their own weight and accomplish the mission. Hopefully, they won't have to put up with as much as I had to.”

This quote from Chandler gave rise to the title of this article. “I don't have to say anything to people who said I couldn't make it. I just graduated.” There is a parallel Chinese proverb that says, “The man who says that a task is impossible should get out of the way of the man doing it.”

And now, the Marines have one more EOD technician ready to jump in anywhere and dismantle terrorists ... and their bombs. That would be a continuation of Chandler’s version of “the best revenge”.

Tom Kovach
DISCUSS THIS ARTICLE IN THE FORUM! Tom Kovach is a free-lance writer, proud father of a teenage daughter, certified paralegal, former talk-radio host, and a former USAF Blue Beret. Tom led a counter-terrorist team overseas, and was on a protection detail for President Reagan. He lives in Nashville, and has written a “9-11” memorial song.

http://www.mensnewsdaily.com/archive/k/kovach/03/kovach122303.htm

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By R.W. "Dick" Gaines
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1952-72
Semper Fidelis
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VIETNAM WAR PROTESTORS: WHAT THEY REALLY WANTED

===================================

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE Articles

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

May/June 1977

PEACE? DEFEAT? What Did the Vietnam War Protesters Want?

By: James Webb

It is difficult to explain to my children that in my teens and early twenties the most frequently heard voices of my peers were trying to destroy the foundations of American society, so that it might be rebuilt according to their own narcissistic notions. In retrospect it’s hard even for some of us who went through those times to understand how highly educated people—most of them spawned from the comforts of the upper-middle class—could have seriously advanced the destructive ideas that were in the air during the late ’60s and early ’70s. Even Congress was influenced by the virus.

After President Nixon resigned in August of 1974, that fall’s congressional elections brought 76 new Democrats to the House, and eight to the Senate. A preponderance of these freshmen had run on McGovernesque platforms. Many had been viewed as weak candidates before Nixon’s resignation, and some were glaringly unqualified, such as then-26-year-old Tom Downey of New York, who had never really held a job in his life and was still living at home with his mother.

This so-called Watergate Congress rode into town with an overriding mission that had become the rallying point of the American Left: to end all American assistance in any form to the besieged government of South Vietnam. Make no mistake—this was not the cry of a few years earlier to stop young Americans from dying. It had been two years since the last American soldiers left Vietnam, and fully four years since the last serious American casualty calls there.

For reasons that escape historical justification, even after America’s military withdrawal the Left continued to try to bring down the incipient South Vietnamese democracy. Future White House aide Harold Ickes and others at "Project Pursestrings"—assisted at one point by an ambitious young Bill Clinton—worked to cut off all congressional funding intended to help the South Vietnamese defend themselves. The Indochina Peace Coalition, run by David Dellinger and headlined by Jane Fonda and Tom Hayden, coordinated closely with Hanoi throughout 1973 and 1974, and barnstormed across America’s campuses, rallying students to the supposed evils of the South Vietnamese government. Congressional allies repeatedly added amendments to spending bills to end U.S. support of Vietnamese anti-Communists, precluding even air strikes to help South Vietnamese soldiers under attack by North Vietnamese units that were assisted by Soviet-bloc forces.

PROGRESSIVES FOR THE VIET CONG

"The range of debate was, if you were in favor of getting out of Vietnam tomorrow and kicking ROTC off all the campuses, and believed that the U.S. should hang its head in shame over the Vietnam War, then you were a fascist. If you wanted to bomb all the U.S. military installations and actively exult at a victory of the Viet Cong, then you were a progressive."

— from a March 5, 1997 Washington Post interview in which James Fallows describes opinion at Harvard during his student days there in the late-1960s

Then in early 1975 the Watergate Congress dealt non-Communist Indochina the final blow. The new Congress icily resisted President Gerald Ford’s January request for additional military aid to South Vietnam and Cambodia. This appropriation would have provided the beleaguered Cambodian and South Vietnamese militaries with ammunition, spare parts, and tactical weapons needed to continue their own defense. Despite the fact that the 1973 Paris Peace Accords called specifically for "unlimited military replacement aid" for South Vietnam, by March the House Democratic Caucus voted overwhelmingly, 189-49, against any additional military assistance to Vietnam or Cambodia.

The rhetoric of the antiwar Left during these debates was filled with condemnation of America’s war-torn allies, and promises of a better life for them under the Communism that was sure to follow. Then-Congressman Christopher Dodd typified the hopeless naiveté of his peers when he intoned that "calling the Lon Nol regime an ally is to debase the word.... The greatest gift our country can give to the Cambodian people is peace, not guns. And the best way to accomplish that goal is by ending military aid now." Tom Downey, having become a foreign policy expert in the two months since being freed from his mother’s apron strings, pooh-poohed the coming Cambodian holocaust that would kill more than one-third of the country’s population, saying, "The administration has warned that if we leave there will be a bloodbath. But to warn of a new bloodbath is no justification for extending the current bloodbath."

On the battlefields of Vietnam the elimination of all U.S. logistical support was stunning and unanticipated news. South Vietnamese commanders had been assured of material support as the American military withdrew—the same sort of aid the U.S. routinely provided allies from South Korea to West Germany—and of renewed U.S. air strikes if the North attacked the South in violation of the 1973 Paris Peace Accords. Now they were staring at a terrifyingly uncertain future, even as the Soviets continued to assist the Communist North.

As the shocked and demoralized South Vietnamese military sought to readjust its forces to cope with serious shortages, the newly refurbished North Vietnamese immediately launched a major offensive. Catching many units out of position, the North rolled down the countryside over a 55-day period. In the ensuing years I have interviewed South Vietnamese survivors of these battles, many of whom spent ten years and more in Communist concentration camps after the war. The litany is continuous: "I had no ammunition." "I was down to three artillery rounds per tube per day." "I had nothing to give my soldiers." "I had to turn off my radio because I could no longer bear to hear their calls for help."

The reaction in the United States to this debacle defines two distinct camps that continue to be identifiable in many of the issues we face today. For most of those who fought in Vietnam, and for their families, friends, and political compatriots, this was a dark and deeply depressing month. The faces we saw running in terror from the North Vietnamese assault were real and familiar, not simply video images. The bodies that fell like spinning snowflakes toward cruel deaths after having clung hopelessly to the outer parts of departing helicopters and aircraft may have been people we knew or tried to help. Even for those who had lost their faith in America’s ability to defeat the Communists, this was not the way it was supposed to end.

For those who had evaded the war and come of age believing our country was somehow evil, even as they romanticized the intentions of the Communists, these few weeks brought denials of their own responsibility in the debacle, armchair criticisms of the South Vietnamese military, or open celebrations. At the Georgetown University Law Center where I was a student, the North’s blatant discarding of the promises of peace and elections contained in the 1973 Paris Accords, followed by the rumbling of North Vietnamese tanks through the streets of Saigon, was treated by many as a cause for actual rejoicing.

Denial is rampant in 1997, but the truth is this end result was the very goal of the antiwar movement’s continuing efforts in the years after American withdrawal. George McGovern, more forthcoming than most, bluntly stated as much to this writer during a break in taping a 1995 edition of cnn’s "Crossfire." After I had argued that the war was clearly winnable even toward the end if we had changed our strategy, the 1972 presidential candidate who had offered to go to Hanoi on his knees commented, "What you don’t understand is that I didn’t want us to win that war." Mr. McGovern was not alone. He was part of a small but extremely influential minority who eventually had their way.

HARVARD HATES AMERICAN SOLDIERS

One way the students at Harvard showed their guilt about their privilege and safety was to scorn those who went to Vietnam, and when the war was over, to shun them. Al Gore, who volunteered for Vietnam after his graduation in 1969, recalled the time in the following September when he returned to Cambridge on leave. "My hair was cut short," he said, "and I wore my uniform. I walked through the streets of Cambridge, and I became so angry at the presumption of those who instantly shouted epithets and sneered."

—from Coming Apart: America and the Harvard Riots of 1969, by Roger Rosenblatt, 1997

There is perhaps no greater testimony to the celebratory atmosphere that surrounded the Communist victory in Vietnam than the 1975 Academy Awards, which took place on April 8, just three weeks before the South’s final surrender. The award for Best Feature Documentary went to the film Hearts and Minds, a vicious piece of propaganda that assailed American cultural values as well as our effort to assist South Vietnam’s struggle for democracy. The producers, Peter Davis and Bert Schneider [who plays a role in David Horowitz’s story—see page 31], jointly accepted the Oscar. Schneider was frank in his support of the Communists. As he stepped to the mike he commented that "It is ironic that we are here at a time just before Vietnam is about to be liberated." Then came one of the most stunning—if intentionally fforgotten—moments in Hollywood history. As a struggling country many Americans had paid blood and tears to try to preserve was disappearing beneath a tank onslaught, Schneider pulled out a telegram from our enemy, the Vietnamese Communist delegation in Paris, and read aloud its congratulations to his film. Without hesitating, Hollywood’s most powerful people rewarded Schneider’s reading of the telegram with a standing ovation.

Those of us who either fought in Vietnam or supported our efforts there look at this 1975 "movie moment" with unforgetting and unmitigated amazement. Who were these people who so energetically poisoned the rest of the world’s view of us? How had they turned so virulently against their own countrymen? How could they stand and applaud the victory of a Communist enemy who had taken 58,000 American lives and crushed a struggling, pro-democratic ally? Could they and the rest of us be said to be living in the same country anymore?

Not a peep was heard then, or since, from Hollywood regarding the people who disappeared behind Vietnam’s bamboo curtain. No one has ever mentioned the concentration camps into which a million South Vietnamese soldiers were sent; 56,000 to die, 250,000 to stay for more than six years, and some for as long as 18. No one criticized the forced relocations, the corruption, or the continuing police state. More to the point, with the exception of the well-intentioned but artistically weak Hamburger Hill, one searches in vain for a single major film since that time that has portrayed American soldiers in Vietnam with dignity and in a true context.

Why? Because the film community, as with other elites, never liked, respected, or even understood those who answered the call and served. And at a time when a quiet but relentless battle is taking place over how history will remember our country’s involvement in Vietnam, those who ridiculed government policy, avoided military service, and actively supported an enemy who turned out to be vicious and corrupt do not want to be remembered as having been so naive and so wrong.

"IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT AMERICA SHOULD LOSE THE WAR."

In 1972, the radical magazine Ramparts published classified information revealing that a secret U.S. security agency had cracked the Soviet intelligence code and was reading Russian electronic communications at will. "Agents were killed when such secrets were at stake," writes Ramparts editor David Horowitz in his recently published memoir Radical Son. Also, "by revealing to the Soviets that their security had been breached, we alerted them that they needed to repair it.… For me, the overriding justification for publishing the article was one that weighed heavily on all the political decisions I made: It was important that America should lose the war.… I was convinced that America’s loss would be Vietnam’s gain. An American defeat would weaken oppression everywhere."

Prior to publication, Ramparts editors panicked that they could go to jail for publishing the information, so they sought assistance from Harvard professor Charles Nesson. Then, armed with "advice from a famous constitutional law professor on how to commit treason and get away with it," they printed the revelations.

Many other radicals also worked actively for U.S. defeat, Horowitz notes. "Saul Landau volunteered himself as an agent of the Castro regime. Tom Hayden and Jane Fonda went to North Vietnam and urged American troops to defect." Even many everyday liberals got swept up in the era’s anti-American feeling, says Horowitz, illustrating this with a personal story:

"In 1973, while the Communists were pressing their advantage in South Vietnam, I spoke at a convocation at Robert Hutchins’ Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions. It was held in a Washington, D.C. ballroom, with a thousand people in attendance. I stepped up to the microphone and began a peroration:

We are not yet disengaged from the most criminal war in our history, a war against a technologically defenseless people which—let us not mince words—ranks with the worst atrocities ever committed by one portion of the human race against another.… This [war has] its roots…in the very character of the American enterprise and ambition...Vietnam is not so much a betrayal of the American tradition as its fulfillment.

When I finished, the audience of comfortable, middle-class professionals rose to its feet and gave me a standing ovation.…

My speech illustrated the real importance of Vietnam to the radical cause, which was not ultimately about Vietnam but about our own antagonism to America, our desire for revolution. Vietnam served to justify the desire; we needed the war and its violent images to vindicate our destructive intentions. That was why the victory of our ‘anti-war’ movement seemed so hollow when it came. The peace killed the very energies that gave our movement life."

Among everyday Americans, attitudes during this troubled time were much healthier. Behind the media filtering and distortion on Vietnam, the fact is that our citizenry agreed far more consistently with those of us who fought than with those who undermined our fight. This was especially true, interestingly, among the young Americans now portrayed as having rebelled against the war.

As reported in Public Opinion, Gallup surveys from 1966 to the end of U.S. involvement show that younger Americans actually supported the Vietnam war longer than any other age group. Even by January of 1973, when 68 percent of Americans over the age of 50 believed it had been a mistake to send troops to Vietnam, only 49 percent of those between 25 and 29 agreed. These findings that the youth cohort as a whole was distinctly unradical were buttressed by 1972 election results—where 18- to 29-year-olds preferred Richard Nixon to George McGovern by 52 to 46 percent.

Similarly, despite persistent allegations to the contrary by former protesters who now dominate media and academia, the 1970 invasion of Cambodia—which caused widespread campus demonstrations, including a riot that led to four deaths at Kent State University—was strongly supported by the public. According to Harris surveys, nearly 6 in 10 Americans believed the Cambodian invasion was justified. A majority in that same May 1970 survey supported an immediate resumption of bombings in North Vietnam, a complete repudiation of the antiwar movement.

Vietnam veterans, though persistently maligned in film, news reports, and classrooms as unwilling, unsuccessful soldiers, have been well thought of by average Americans. In the most comprehensive study ever done on Vietnam vets (Harris Survey, 1980, commissioned by the Veterans Administration), 73 percent of the general public and 89 percent of Vietnam veterans agreed with the statement that "The trouble in Vietnam was that our troops were asked to fight in a war which our political leaders in Washington would not let them win." Seventy percent of those who fought in Vietnam disagreed with the statement "It is shameful what my country did to the Vietnamese people." Fully 91 percent of those who served in Vietnam combat stated that they were glad they had served their country, and 74 percent said they had enjoyed their time in the military. Moreover, 71 percent of those who expressed an opinion indicated that they would go to Vietnam again, even knowing the end result and the ridicule that would be heaped on them when they returned.

This same survey contained what was called a "feelings thermometer," measuring the public’s attitudes toward various groups on a scale of 1 to 10. Veterans who served in Vietnam rated a 9.8 on this scale. Doctors scored a 7.9, TV reporters a 6.1, politicians a 5.2, antiwar demonstrators a 5.0, and draft evaders who went to Canada came in at 3.3.

DISDAIN FOR ONE'S OWN DEFENDERS

Cambridge professors and Manhattan lawyers and their guitar-strumming children...privileged members of a privileged nation, believed that their pleasant position could be maintained without anything visibly ugly happening in the world. They were full of aesthetic disdain for their own defenders.... The protesters were spitting on the cops who were trying to keep their property—the USA and its many amenities—intact. A common report in this riotous era was of slum-dwellers throwing rocks and bottles at the firemen come to put out fires; the peace marchers, the upper-middle-class housewives pushing baby carriages along in candlelit processions, seemed to me to be behaving identically, without the excuse of being slum-dwellers.

— from "On Not Being a Dove," by John Updike, Commentary, March 1989

Contrary to persistent mythology, two-thirds of those who served during Vietnam were volunteers rather than draftees, and 77 percent of those who died were volunteers. Of those who died, 86 percent were Caucasian, 12.5 percent were African-American, and 1.2 percent were from other races. The common claim that it was minorities and the poor who were left to do the dirty work of military service in Vietnam is false. The main imbalance in the war was simply that the privileged avoided their obligations, and have persisted since that time in demeaning the experience in order to protect themselves from the judgment of history.

And what of these elites who misread not only a war but also their own countrymen? Where are they now, other than in the White House? On this vital historical issue that defined our generation, they now keep a low profile, and well they should.

What an eerie feeling it must have been for those who staked the journey of their youth on the idea that their own country was an evil force, to have watched their naiveté unravel in the years following 1975. How sobering it must have been for those who allowed themselves to move beyond their natural denial, to observe the spectacle of hundreds of thousands of South Vietnamese fleeing the "pure flame of the revolution" on rickety boats that gave them a 50 percent chance of death at sea, or to see television pictures of thousands of Cambodian skulls lying in open fields, part of the millions killed by Communist "liberators." How hollow the memories of drug-drenched and sex-enshrined antiwar rallies must be; how false the music that beatified their supposedly noble dissent.

Indeed, let’s be frank. How secretly humiliating to stare into the face of a disabled veteran, or to watch the valedictory speech of the latest Vietnamese-American kid whose late father fought alongside the Americans in a cause they openly mocked, derided, and despised. And what a shame that the system of government that allowed that student to be so quickly successful here is not in place in the country of her origin.

James Webb, a Marine rifle platoon and company commander in Vietnam, has served as Secretary of the Navy and is the author of several novels.


©1998 - 2004 James Webb Enterprises, All Rights Reserved
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By R.W. "Dick" Gaines
GySgt USMC (Ret.)
1952-72
Semper Fidelis
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The Court-martial At Parris Island

INFO:
Ribbon Creek Incident, Plt #71, S/Sgt Matt McKeon, PISC 1956, etc.
Authors return to Parris Island for book signing

Published "Tuesday
By MICHAEL KERR
Gazette staff writer

Eugene Alvarez and John C. Stevens III try to make it back to Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island at least once a year.

The former Devil Dogs come to see how the legendary base where they became Marines -- and in Alvarez's case made Marines -- has changed.

They come to see old friends and recount stories of the good ol' days aboard the depot.

Last week, however, they came to mix a little business with the pleasure of visiting a place that helped form the men they are now.

Thursday afternoon, Alvarez and Stevens set up shop at the depot's Marine Corps Exchange for a dual book signing of Alvarez's latest work "Images of America: Parris Island," and Stevens' first book, "Court-Martial at Parris Island: The Ribbon Creek Incident."

"I always love to come back and visit Parris Island," said Alvarez, who went through boot camp aboard the depot in 1950 and served as a drill instructor there from 1953 to 1954 and again from 1956 to 1959. "It just changes all the time."

Sitting behind a desk adorned with a flower vase, American flag and stacks of their books, Alvarez and Stevens signed copies of their latest works for anyone who wanted one.

Some of the folks getting signatures were already fans. Others had never heard of the books before they wandered into the store Thursday afternoon.

"I was just always interested in (Parris Island)," said Alvarez, who received a research grant from the Marine Corps to get started with his first book.

"Images of America: Parris Island," his fifth book, is now in its third printing and is going strong, he said.

"It's going over very well," said Alvarez, who lives in Georgia.

The book, filled with photographs chronicling the history and legacy of Parris Island, is a visual trip through time as the depot, and the Corps, expanded and changed.

While Alvarez is a veteran in military nonfiction, Stevens is a newcomer.

"Court-Martial at Parris Island" is his first book and consumed three years of his life, two to research the Ribbon Creek incident and one to write the manuscript.

"When I went through Parris Island, Ribbon Creek had just occurred," said Stevens, now a judge in Massachusetts. "The drill instructors were very sensitive about it. They thought one of their (drill instructors) was railroaded at the time."

Years after he had left the Corps and become a lawyer, Stevens decided to give a doctoral dissertation on the April 8, 1956, incident in which drill instructor Staff Sgt. Matthew McKeon led his platoon on a forced night march through Ribbon Creek to restore sagging discipline.

A strong tidal current in the creek swept through and six men drowned, sparking a national news story and a court-martial for McKeon.

Stevens never gave the dissertation, but the story -- which affected his and every recruit's training from then on and changed Parris Island forever -- stayed with him, eventually becoming a critically acclaimed debut book.

"Marines from all over the country have found me and have written me," Stevens said. "It's gotten an outstanding reception."

The most rewarding aspect of the undertaking was the opportunity to meet and discuss the incident with McKeon himself, Stevens said.

"He has lived with that burden and he always will," Stevens said, adding that he hopes the interview helped McKeon in some small way.

"It enabled him to purge himself of some of the shame," he said. "I found it very rewarding."

Gunnery Sergeants Robert Bergmann and John Spencer both stumbled upon the book signing Thursday afternoon and picked up copies of "Court-Martial at Parris Island."

Bergmann said he had no idea anyone had written a book about Ribbon Creek, but was looking forward to delving into it.

Spencer knew the book was out there, but hadn't had the chance to read it yet.

"I knew about the incident," he said. "I just want to find out more about it."

For Alvarez and Stevens, the trip to Parris Island was both a vacation and a chance to meet some young Marines and see how things are done today.

Like many former Marines who return to the depot, Alvarez said there is a litany of physical changes aboard Parris Island, but that the men and women in uniform are the same as they always have been.

"They're still quality people," Alvarez said. "Older guys like us like to talk about back then, but they do a good job today."

Stevens said he couldn't agree more.

"I'm so impressed with these young Marines," he said. "The greatest thing about this book for me is that it reconnected me with the Marine Corps. That's a priceless heritage."
Copyright 2003 The Beaufort Gazette • May not be republished in any form without the express written permission of the publisher.

http://www.beaufortgazette.com/local_news/military/story/2927032p-2688933c.html



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This is...
Gunny G's...
GLOBE and ANCHOR
Marines Sites & Forums
By R.W. "Dick" Gaines
GySgt USMC (Ret.)
1952-72
Semper Fidelis
~~~~~~~~~~